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The Impact of Derivatives Usage on Firm Value: 
Evidence from Greece 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper presents evidence on the use of derivative contracts in the risk 
management process of Greek non-financial firms and its potential impact on firm 
value. The sample of the research consists of 81 Greek non-financial firms with 
exposure to financial risks that are listed in the Athens Stock Exchange and have their 
annual report published according to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(I.F.R.S) for the years 2004-2006. The subject of investigation is whether hedging 
with derivatives materially increases firm value as many related research has proven, 
or whether hedging does not affect firm value and can be attributed to managerial or 
other motives. Having used Tobins Q as a proxy for firm value a positive and 
significant effect of hedging on it is verified, 4.6% of firm value on average, not only 
concerning the general use of derivatives, but also the use of foreign exchange 
derivatives and interest rate derivatives in particular. Controlling for managerial 
motives does not change the sign of the hedging premium, nor its magnitude. 
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I. Introduction. 
 
 Hedging corporate risks with the use of derivative contracts has been an 
increasingly popular corporate activity during the last decades. This evolution is 
directly related to the gradual shift of interest to the volatility of the financial and 
capital markets worldwide and to the crucial effect this volatility has on the 
performance and the profitability of firms. The constantly transforming financial 
environment and the activation of firms in the contemporary globalized market makes 
more and more imperative the identification and administration at the management 
level of the corporate exposure to sources of financial risk, such as the foreign 
exchange rates, the interest rates, the equity and the commodity prices. 
During the last two decades there have been numerous studies trying to 
analyse the determinants and the theoretical motives behind this corporate activity, as 
well as its correlation with other corporate aspects such as the capital structure of the 
firm, the amount of leverage, the investment policy and the growth opportunities of 
the firm. However, limited is the extent of research with respect to the question of 
whether hedging with derivatives is a value increasing corporate activity for non-
financial firms and what is the amount of its impact on firm value, if any.  
 A significant drawback in the applied research concerning the corporate use of 
derivatives has been the limited information about the hedging positions of firms. 
This lack of available data is attributed to the fact that until recently firms in most 
countries were not obliged to reveal to the public neither the risks they face, nor the 
actions they take to manage these risks. A major exception has been the United States 
where since the beginning of 90s firms are required to disclose information about the 
usage of financial instruments with off-balance sheet risk and with concentration of 
credit risk. 
 The latest convergence that is globally observed with respect to the way the 
financial statements of the firms are compiled and presented, has led to the 
implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standards (I.F.R.S.) in many 
countries worldwide as well as in Greece, a country-member of Eurozone. According 
to the I.F.R.S. firms must disclose whether they use derivative contracts or not for 
hedging or trading purposes and they have to provide information about the whole 
specter of risks they face and the actions they take to properly handle them.  
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This major change in the disclosure requirements of the native firms has 
allowed to investigate whether the use of derivative contracts for hedging purposes is 
a value increasing strategy for firms with exposure to financial risks and to quantify 
the impact of hedging on firm value. In order to verify this basic hypothesis non-
financial firms with exposure to risks such as the foreign exchange risk, the interest 
rates risk, the commodity price and equity price risk are considered, they are 
categorized as hedgers or non-hedgers depending on whether they report using 
derivatives for any of those risk categories in their annual report and differences in 
their value are recorded and analyzed.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. A review of previous 
research on the use of derivatives is presented in section II, while section III discusses 
the sample construction and the definition of the variables that will be used. Sections 
IV and V present the methodology and the results of the univariate and the 
multivariate analysis undertaken respectively and the last section VI concludes. 
 
II. Review of previous surveys. 
 
 Despite the fact that the literature concerning the corporate use of derivatives 
has been extensive and the main concept behind corporate hedging has been firm 
value maximization, the direct impact of hedging on firm value had not been 
examined by any researcher until the recent past. The first to investigate the 
contribution of derivatives to value maximization have been Allayannis and Weston 
[Allayannis/Weston, 2001]. In their article The use of foreign currency derivatives 
and firm market value they consider the use of foreign currency derivatives in a 
sample of non-financial firms and how this practice affects firm value1, and they 
reveal a positive relationship between firm value and hedging. The impact of 
derivatives usage is statistically and economically significant for firms with exposure 
to foreign exchange risk and it amounts 4.87% of firm value on average, after a series 
of controls. 
 This pioneering research is considered the introduction to the direct approach 
in the attempt to empirically verify that derivatives usage is positively evaluated by 
the market and is significantly associated with firm value, with an adequate number of 
                                                
1 Firm value is proxied by the variable Tobins Q. 
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studies to follow. The main difference of the direct approach from the previously used 
one is that derivatives usage is now the independent variable and under examination is 
its relationship with firm value which is the dependent variable of the model, after 
controlling for other factors that also influence firm value2. The hedge dummy 
coefficient in the regression is interpreted as the premium or the discount on firm 
value which is created by the use of derivatives3. 
 After Allayannis and Weston [Allayannis/Weston, 2001] an extensive number 
of researchers has focused on the investigation of the relationship between hedging 
and firm value, some of them by exactly implementing the initial model and others by 
adjusting it to the occasional economic environment under consideration, with 
controversial up to now results. Carter, Rogers and Simkins [Carter et al., 2004(a)] 
examine in the U.S. airline industry not only whether hedging fuel price risk ads value 
to the firm, but also if the source of the added value is accordant to the hedging 
theory. Since the fuel cost amounts on average 13% of the firms operational cost, 
using derivatives to manage the volatility in fuel prices is a justifiable choice for firms 
in the industry. The authors implement the Allayannis/Weston model with slight 
adjustments and find hedging to create a premium of 14.94% -16.08% on firm value, 
statistically significant at the level of 10% and 1%. The size of the premium is larger 
than in previous studies, which may be attributed to the fact that all firms in the 
sample spend a greater amount of their income for fuels and this influences heavily 
their value. In order to identify the source of the premium they repeat the previous 
analysis but they now use a dummy that measures the interaction between hedging 
and capital expenditures, they find that capital expenditures are valued higher for 
hedgers and they estimate that 52%-100% of the value premium is created by the 
ability of hedging to stabilize and protect capital expenditures and to avoid 
underinvestment. 
 In another empirical research under the same methodology in the U.S. oil and 
gas producers, Jin and Jorion [Jin/Jorion, 2006] disclose that derivatives usage 
reduces the firms stock price sensitivity with respect to oil and gas prices and 
contrary to previous studies find derivatives to have no significant impact on firm 
                                                
2 According to the indirect approach, researchers try to prove whether hedging is conducted subject to 
the motives suggested by the theory, such as tax reduction, reduction of costs of financial distress and 
of agency costs, etc., in which case firm value is increased. Under this methodology, hedging is the 
dependent variable.  
3 In the whole article hedging is used alternatively to the term derivatives usage. Firms that use 
derivatives for other than hedging reasons are not considered derivatives users. 
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value. The main contribution of the study is a new, simple estimation of Tobins Q 
which is the proxy for firm value and the outcome of the analysis, which shows that 
derivatives usage is insignificantly related to value (hedging gas prices leads to a 
3.7% discount in firm value, while oil hedging rises firm value by 0.7%, in both cases 
without statistical significance). Unable to support the hypothesis that firms that 
hedge their exposures are valued higher relative to firms that do not hedge, the 
authors attribute the establishment of hedging to the personal benefits of the 
management team. With respect to the hedging premium that other studies have 
documented, they attribute it to factors such as the information asymmetry or the 
operational hedging which influence firm value, but happens to be positively 
correlated with the use of derivatives.  
 In line with previous researchers Lookman (2003) investigates the impact of 
hedging in a sample of oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) firms, he 
differentiates by discerning firm exposure to primary and secondary risks 
depending on how extensive influence they have on the financial operation of the firm 
and finds that hedging the primary risk exposure leads to a value discount of 17%, 
while hedging the secondary exposure creates a premium of 26.7% contrary to 
expectations. Therefore he concludes that hedging does not lead to higher firm value 
and introduces an alternative hypothesis, according to which the observed effect on 
firm value is caused by the fact that hedging serves as a noisy proxy for other 
variables that are associated with firm value and have not been taken into account. 
Once these factors are introduced into the analysis, the valuation effects become 
insignificant. 
 A study of much greater scale undertaken by Bartram, Brown and Fehle 
[Bartram et al., 2003] in a sample of 7319 non financial firms in 50 countries shows 
extensive usage of derivatives outside United States and provides evidence in favour 
of the hypothesis that hedging is a value adding corporate activity. The results reveal 
significantly higher firm value for hedgers of the interest rate risk in all countries, 
while the evidence concerning the foreign exchange risk is also positive but weaker. 
As far as the motivation behind hedging is concerned, the authors believe that the 
findings are more consistent with an alternative naïve hypothesis that firms simply 
hedge once reaching a certain level of financial sophistication.  
 Dan, Gu and Xu [Dan et al., 2005] try a different econometric approach, they 
focus on the potential existence of non linear returns due to hedging and they use 
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linear and non linear generalized additive models in their analysis in order to examine 
this possibility. They conclude that derivatives usage has no significant impact on 
firm value and that leverage is the only control variable that is significantly but 
negatively related to value. The evidence suggests that the non linear GAM model fits 
better the data than the linear one. 
 From the viewpoint of managerial motives Hagelin, Holmen, Knopf and 
Pramborg [Hagelin et al., 2004] prove that when the hedging strategy is based upon 
incentives from managers stock options, firm value decreases. In particular, beside 
the implementation of the initial model of Allayannis/Weston (2001) where they find 
that hedging is only positively correlated with firm value without causing any increase 
in it, they estimate an interactive term between hedge and option delta which captures 
the valuation effect of derivatives usage when managers hedge their option portfolios. 
They conclude that when hedges are used to reduce the stock price sensitivity of 
managerial stock options, hedging creates a value discount.  
 In a totally different spirit and far from the previous methodology Graham and 
Rogers [Graham/Rogers, 2002] examine if firms hedge their risks in response to tax 
incentives and how this affects their value. Hedging appears to increase the mean 
corporate leverage by 3.03%, effect that creates tax benefits due to increased interest 
deduction equal to 1.1%-2.1% of market value of assets and an equivalent increase in 
firm value. 
Contrary to most of the previous studies, Guay and Kothari [Guay/Kothari, 
2003] find that the extent of the corporate financial risk that is hedged is too small to 
influence firm value, especially in the amount previously mentioned. The controls that 
have taken place illustrate that in the case of a simultaneous extreme change in the 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates and commodity prices, the expected change in 
the value of the corporate derivatives portfolio will not exceed 4% of the book value 
of firms assets and thus derivatives usage does not have a significant influence on 
firm value. In addition, the average firm uses derivatives adequate to hedge 3%-6% of 
the total corporate exposure to the volatility of the foreign exchange and interest rates, 
which is also a very small position to have significant value effects. 
Finally, Allayannis, Rountree and Weston [Allayannis et al., 2005] examine 
the volatility of cashflows and its relationship with firm value, they support the 
hypothesis that investors evaluate higher firms with smooth cashflows and find strong 
evidence that the increase in the volatility of cashflows by one standard deviation 
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leads to a reduction of 30%-37% in firm value. Since derivatives usage leads to the 
minimization of the volatility of corporate cashflows, it is made obvious the exact 
mechanism through which hedging affects firm value.  
 
III. Sample description and definition of variables. 
 
In accordance with the existing literature the sample of the current research 
consists of firms that are listed in the Athens Stock Exchange and fulfill the following 
criterions: a) they are non-financial firms4 -financial firms are excluded because they 
are usually both end users and intermediaries in derivative transactions, they often act 
as market makers in derivatives markets and thus their motives and behaviour are not 
representative of the hedging behaviour of non-financial firms-, b) their base and 
headquarters are in Greece, c) they have their annual report published according to the 
International Financial Reporting Standards for the fiscal years 2004-20065, d) they 
are exposed to any of the foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity or 
equity price risk and e) their annual turnover is 100 million or more for each of the 
examined years. The criterion of the annual turnover has been set in order to exclude 
small firms so that the sample matches as close as possible the sample of related 
studies, however the huge differences in size make the comparison with U.S. and 
Canadian firms quite difficult. 
The number of firms that fulfill these criterions are 81 and thus for the three 
years period a balanced panel data of 243 firm-year observations emerges (both time-
series and cross-sectional data). The main advantages of a balanced panel data 
approach is that it allows for the control of individual heterogeneity, it gives more 
informative data, less collinearity, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency, as 
well as it eliminates any potential bias resulting from aggregation over firms or 
individuals (Baltagi, 1995). 
                                                
4 According to the Athens Stock Exchange classification financial firms include retail and investment 
banks, insurances, real estate and leasing companies, brokerage and investing houses and all kind of 
funds, which are all excluded from the sample. 
5 I.F.R.S. were initially implemented on 01.01.2005 but for reasons of comparability and transparency 
firms were required to also publish their balance sheet for fiscal year 2004 according to the I.F.R.S, fact 
that made the collection of the required information concerning firms hedging positions of that year 
possible.   
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The sample is thereafter divided according to whether firms are exposed to 
foreign exchange risk or interest rate risk6. A firm is considered to have an exposure 
to foreign exchange risk if it reports foreign assets, sales or income for the three-year 
period examined, while the exposure to interest rate risk is documented if the firm 
reports fluctuating debt over the same period. 60 firms report exposure to foreign 
exchange risk and thus there are 180 such firm-year observations, while the firms 
reporting interest rate risk exposure amount 74 and so 222 firm-year observations 
emerge. 
The sample is also divided depending on whether firms use derivatives for 
hedging purposes. A company is considered a hedger when the full sample is 
considered if it uses any kind of derivative contract for risk management purposes and 
in this case the hedge dummy takes the value of 1. In the sample of firms with foreign 
exchange exposure a firm is considered a hedger only if it uses foreign exchange 
derivatives (the FCD dummy takes the value of 1) and in the sample of interest rate 
risk exposed firms hedgers are identified by the use of derivatives with underlying 
value interest rates (the IRD dummy takes the value of 1 in this case), allowing the 
construction of three independent hedging dummies.  
The main variable on which the current analysis is based and which can be 
used as indication of both the value and the growth options of the firm, is the variable 
Tobins Q. Tobins Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement cost of its assets and if it takes a value of grater than unit then the market 
appreciates the value of the firm to be higher than the next best use of firms assets, 
which is their replacement cost. The existing literature provides many different 
definitions of this variable, with the more accurate one to be developed by Lindenberg 
and Ross [Lindenberg/Ross, 1981], however due to limitations in the availability of 
data the methodology selected to estimate Tobins Q in this research follows an 
algorithm undertaken by most of the researchers in similar studies. According to it, Q 
is defined as the sum of total assets and market value of equity minus the book value 
of equity, all divided by total assets7. In addition, two alternative ways of estimating 
Q are used: the first one is the ratio of market to book value of equity, while the 
                                                
6 All firms in the sample have exposure to at least one financial risk. As the number of firms that report 
exposure to commodity price risk is limited and the number of firms that report hedging that risk is 
even smaller, the sample is not divided according to whether firms have exposure to commodity price 
risk. None of the firms in the sample reports exposure to equity price risk.  
7 This methodology of estimating Q is followed by Pramborg (2004), Allayannis et al. (2003), Hagelin 
et.al (2004), Jin/Jorion (2006), Lookman (2003). 
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second one is the ratio of market value of equity to total sales, all three used as 
proxies of firm value.  
Table 1.A, Panel A, presents the summary statistics of the main variables that 
are used in the article for the whole sample of firms, while Panels B and C present 
summary statistics for the same variables regarding firms with exposure to foreign 
exchange risk and interest rate risk respectively. The exact definitions of these 
variables and others that will be used in the upcoming analysis are given in Table 2. 
The mean value of assets in the whole sample approaches 924 millions and 
the mean value of sales approaches 727 millions, while the median value of both 
these variables differs substantially from the mean, which is a sign of skewness. The 
78% of firms report exposure to foreign exchange risk, the sales from operation 
abroad as percentage of total sales are 21.8% on average, the ratio of total debt to 
book value of equity approaches 1.54 on average, while the mean market value for 
firms in the whole sample is close to 764 millions. The 44% of firms in the whole 
sample use any kind of derivatives and in particular 34% of them use foreign 
exchange derivatives and 28% of them derivatives with underlying value interest 
rates.  
The mean value of Tobins Q for firms in the whole sample is 1.447, is greater 
than unit and indicates that the market assess the average firm to generate excess 
profits and to perform better than the cost of its assets justify. As the mean value of Q 
is higher than the median value (1.122) which is a sign of skewness in the distribution 
(right skewed distribution), in the multivariate analysis that will follow the natural 
logarithm of Q is used, so that its distribution becomes more symmetric8.   
In the last section of Panel A the statistics of the control variables that will be 
later used in the multivariate analysis are presented and their estimation follows 
Allayannis and Weston [Allayannis/Weston, 2001]. The return on assets for firms in 
the full sample is 5.7% on average, the capital expenditures as percentage of total 
sales approaches 9.2%, while the mean leverage is higher than unity (1.115 versus 
0.469 which is the median value). The R&D expenses as percentage of assets and the 
advertising expenses as percentage of sales are extremely low for most firms, 
sometimes reaching zero. Finally 76.1% of firms pay a dividend and 34.5% of them 
                                                
8 Also observed in Lang and Stulz [Lang/Stulz, 1994], Allayannis and Weston [Allayannis/Weston, 
2001] and in most other related research. 
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are activated in more than one business segments, attitude that will be later analyzed 
as to the impact that is expected to create on firm value. 
 A brief comparison of the data presented in Panels B and C between firms 
with foreign exchange exposure and interest rate exposure respectively reveals that 
firms exposed to foreign exchange risk have on average slightly higher sales, their 
foreign sales are a larger part of their total sales as expected, their mean market value 
is substantially higher and they appear to use derivatives at a greater extent than firms 
with exposure to interest rate risk. As far as Tobins Q and the alternative ways of 
estimating it are concerned, such firms show greater mean value in all cases. 
 Since the main target of the current research is to reveal differences in the 
corporate factors that can be attributed to hedging, the sample of the firms is also 
divided with respect to whether firms use derivatives or not. Table 1.B presents the 
summary statistics for the same variables as before, for hedgers in Panel A (108 firm-
year observations) and for non-hedgers in Panel B (135 firm-year observations). 
Firms that used derivatives during this period have on average much larger 
size both in terms of assets and sales relative to non-users of derivatives, fact that 
verifies previous empirical evidence which supported that it is the large firms that use 
derivatives more often and not the smaller ones, contrary to what the theory suggests. 
In an attempt to explain this contradiction previous researchers provide two different 
arguments, according to the first of which the establishment of a position in 
derivatives markets requires significant initial costs and it is easier for large firms to 
bear these costs, due to economies of scale. On the other hand some researchers 
support the naïve hypothesis that firms start hedging their risks once they achieve a 
certain level of financial sophistication, as at this level financial analysts and rating 
houses consider risk management extremely important and they put significant 
external pressure on managers, as they expect firms to use derivatives9. 
In addition hedgers appear to have at least as double a market value as that of 
non hedgers both in terms of mean and median value, fact which indicates that 
investors value higher firms that hedge their risks and may be interpreted as a sign of 
a premium on firm value due to hedging, hypothesis that is left to be verified in a 
forthcoming section. From the viewpoint of leverage, the data do not verify that firms 
hedge their risks in order to increase their borrowing capacity or to reduce their 
                                                
9 Naive hypothesis of financial sophistication, Bartram et al., (2003). 
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probability of financial distress, as hedgers appear to be less leveraged than non-
hedgers, contrary to expectations. 
 Furthermore, the control variables offer mixed results: hedgers and non-
hedgers appear to have almost the same mean return on assets, when the theory 
suggests that the users of derivatives should be non-profitable firms with high risk of 
financial distress. Significant however is the difference in the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total sales, since derivatives users have a mean value of 11.6% 
contrary to 7.3% of non-users. It can be thus supported that one of the major motives 
in the decision to use derivatives is to reduce the underinvestment cost in firms with 
high growth options and investment opportunities, as hedging theory orders.  
Hedgers have on average a lower ratio of long term debt to book value of 
equity contrary to expectations, while 88% of them pay a dividend, versus 66% of 
non-hedgers. The payment of a dividend is interpreted as ability to access the 
financial markets, as such firms are less likely to be financially constrained and thus 
they are expected to have easier access to the derivative markets and especially to the 
Over the Counter contracts. On the other hand it can be argued that firms which pay a 
dividend are usually healthy enough to avoid a financial distress even without the use 
of derivatives and they may be characterized by lack of investment opportunities10, as 
in the opposite case they would use their excessive liquidity to finance investment 
projects with positive net present value. 
Finally, the evolution in the extent of usage of derivatives among firms in the 
sample is presented in Table 3 for the time period 2004-2006. As it can be seen the 
number of firms that used derivatives has grown from 34 in year 2004 to 38 firms in 
year 2006, which amounts 46.91% of all firms in the sample. The use of currency 
derivatives in the sample of firms with foreign exchange exposure has almost 
remained constant and amounts 40% in those firms, whereas the usage of interest rate 
derivatives has increased over time and is conducted by 23 firms in year 2006, which 
is 31.08% of firms with interest rate exposure.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Argument that contradicts the empirical evidence which supports a positive correlation between 
hedging and investment opportunities. 
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IV. Univariate analysis. 
 
 The main hypothesis the hedging literature deals with is that firms that use 
derivatives for hedging are rewarded by investors with higher valuation compared to 
non-users and thus a significant difference between hedgers and non-hedgers in terms 
of firm value should emerge, a premium that could be attributed to derivatives usage. 
In order to empirically verify this hypothesis a test of equality of the mean and 
median of the firm value as given by Tobins Q and of the two alternative variables is 
conducted, as well as a comparison of total assets among hedgers and non-hedgers. 
The test is performed separately for all firms, firms with foreign exposure and firms 
with interest rate exposure respectively and the results are mixed, as shown in Table 
4. 
 Panel A presents the results of the test of equality of means and medians 
between hedgers and non-hedgers in the full sample, while Panels B and C present the 
same test between users and non-users of currency derivatives among firms with 
foreign exchange exposure and of interest rate derivatives among firms with relative 
exposure respectively. Column 1 gives the mean or median values for hedgers, 
column 2 the same values for non-hedgers, in column 3 the difference between the 
two is presented, column 4 gives the t-statistic for means and the outcome of the 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for median values where appropriate and column 5 
gives the critical probability of each outcome, which defines its significance. 
 In the full sample the test reveals that the difference in the mean value of 
Tobins Q between hedgers and non-hedgers is negative and insignificant, while the 
difference in the median value of the same variable is positive and insignificant. 
When using the alternative Q1 the difference in mean value is negative but the 
difference in median is positive and significant, whereas when the alternative Q2 is 
examined the difference in both mean and median values is positive and significant at 
1% in favour of hedgers, as is also the comparison of the mean and median values of 
total assets. These results demonstrate that hedgers are valued slightly higher than 
non-hedgers, but the size of the premium is not consistent, nor is it robust as expected. 
Since the results are repeated even weaker in the sample of firms with foreign 
exchange exposure (Panel B) or in the same trend as before in the sample of firms 
with interest rate exposure (Panel C), it cannot be supported that derivatives usage 
leads to significantly higher firm value at first glance. On that account a multivariate 
 14
analysis is required in order to isolate other factors that usually affect firm value, a 
procedure that takes place in the next section and is expected to reveal what the exact 
relationship between hedging and firm value is and what is its nature.  
 
V. Multivariate analysis. 
 
A. The empirical model used. 
 This part of the analysis is based on the empirical model of Allayannis and 
Weston [Allayannis/Weston, 2001] which has the form of 
  εγβ +Χ++= hedgeasQTobin )'ln(   (1), 
where Tobins Q is the proxy for firm value, hedge is the hedging dummy, X is a 
number of control variables and ε  is the error term. The reason the natural logarithm 
of Tobins Q is used is to control for the skewness of the variable, as happens with the 
two alternative ways of calculating Q. The hedging dummy differentiates as already 
explained depending on the sample of firms that is investigated and shows whether 
the firm uses foreign currency, interest rate or any kind of derivative contract. In all 
three cases the coefficient of the hedge dummy β is interpreted as a premium or a 
discount on firm value due to hedging, depending on the sign of the coefficient.  
The control variables11 (Χ) of the model that allow the exclusion of any other 
impact on firm value Q besides hedging are:  
a) the log of total assets and alternatively the log of total sales as a proxy for 
size. Since the evidence as to whether size leads to higher profitability is ambiguous, 
so is its expected sign with respect to Q,  
b) a dividend dummy as a proxy for access to financial markets, which takes 
the value of 1 if the firm paid a dividend during the examined period and 0 in the 
opposite case. As firms may ignore projects due to inability to fund them and their 
value may remain high because of that, the variable is expected to be negatively 
related to Q,  
c) the ratio of long-term debt to book value of equity as an indication of 
leverage also with an ambiguous sign, 
 d) the return on assets as a measure of profitability. More profitable firms 
have higher Q, so a positive sign is expected, 
                                                
11 As in Allayannis/Weston (2001). 
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 e) capital expenditures scaled by total sales as a measure of investment 
growth, together with the ratio of advertising expenses to total sales and the ratio of 
research and development expenses to total assets for the same reason, all three 
expected to be positive related to firm value Q, 
f) the ratio of sales from operation abroad to total sales as an indication of 
geographic diversification and expecting a positive association with Q,  
g) an industry diversification dummy that shows if a firm is activated in more 
than one business segments, which is usually negatively related to firm value 
according to previous studies 
and h) three year dummies depending on the fiscal year the data refer to. 
Contrary to Allayannis and Weston [Allayannis/Weston, 2001] lack of available data 
does not allow control for the credit quality by making use of the credit rating of each 
firm, while the econometric method chosen does not allow control for industry effects 
that may arise due to the industry the firm is activated to12. 
 
B. The econometric methodology. 
 As has already been mentioned, the main advantage of a balanced panel data 
analysis is the ability to control for the existence of the non-observable individual 
heterogeneity. The basic idea behind this term is that there are individual 
characteristics that is difficult to be observed or measured and which vary among 
cross sections but are constant over time. However the pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
regression which is the simplest and most common method of analyzing balanced 
panel data does not take into account the effect of the individual heterogeneity when it 
exists and therefore leads to a biased estimator. On that account most of the previous 
researchers have controlled for the potential existence of individual-specific effects 
and have followed a different from OLS methodology, such as a random or fixed 
effects model or a non-linear analysis. 
 In order to select the estimation method of the current regression analysis the 
Breusch-Pagan test and the Hausman test were conducted, as the econometric theory 
dictates. The Breusch-Pagan test is a Lagrange Multiplier test and controls for the 
existence of individual heterogeneity, i.e. whether the pooled OLS is an appropriate 
                                                
12The selected fixed effects methodology assigns each firm a unique intercept, which in combination 
with the 14 industry dummies described in Table 2, leads to perfect collinearity (near singular matrix) 
and the econometric software cannot produce results.     
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method or not. It is based on the null hypothesis that 02 =ασ , which is the same as 
stcor isti ≠= ,0),( , εε . Under the null hypothesis LM is distributed as chi-squared 
with one degree of freedom. The test and its results are displayed in Table 5, the value 
of the test statistic is higher than the 5% critical value and consequently the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Thus there are individual-specific effects in the data and the 
random effects model suits better than the pooled OLS method. 
 The Hausman test which was afterwards conducted distinguishes between the 
random and the fixed effects model and under its null hypothesis no correlation 
among the residuals and the regressors is allowed, which means that in such case only 
the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient. Under the null hypothesis the 
test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with λ degrees of freedom. 
The outcome of the test in Table 6 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% 
level, therefore the estimator of the fixed effects method is the consistent and efficient 
one and the fixed effects is the suitable econometric methodology to be undertaken.  
Furthermore, the standard errors are corrected for the potential existence of 
heteroscedasticity -which is a quite common phenomenon in panel data where the 
cross-section dimension exists- by using the White cross-section method (1980). This 
method provides a coefficient covariance estimator that is robust to cross-equation 
(contemporaneous) correlation as well as to different error variances in each cross-
section. Last but not least, there is no sign of serial correlation in the residuals and 
thus no further action has taken place. 
 
C. The results of the empirical analysis. 
 The results of the empirical analysis as described by equation (1) are presented 
in Table 7, where in Panel A the outcome of the basic regression with dependent 
variable the Tobins Q is shown, while in Panels B and C the same regression is 
repeated, but now the dependent variable is the alternative estimation of Q, AltQ1 and 
AltQ2 respectively. Under the column of all firms are the results of the regression 
in the whole sample of 81 firms with exposure to financial risks (243 observations), 
where the hedge dummy differentiates depending on the usage of any kind of 
derivative contract. Under the column of firms with FX exposure is examined the 
sample of 60 firms with foreign exchange exposure and whether they have used 
foreign exchange derivatives (FCD dummy equal to 1or 0) and in the last column the 
 17
outcome of the regression in the 74 firms with interest rate exposure is shown, where 
the hedge dummy (IRD dummy) alters subject to the use of interest rate derivatives. 
  In Panel A the results in the full sample verify the initial hypothesis that firms 
that hedge their risks with derivatives are valued higher. The coefficient of the hedge 
dummy which depicts the effect of hedging on firm value is positive and significant, 
with a value of 0.04. As the hedge dummy coefficient is interpreted as a change of x% 
in firm value due to full hedging ceteris paribus, this value of the coefficient equals a 
premium of 4% on firm value. The size of the premium is in line with previous 
research of Allayannis and Weston [Allayannis/Weston 2001] and others, who have 
found hedging to create a value premium of 3.6%-14%, while in some cases its size 
reaches 16% or 26% in firms with excessive exposure to risks13. 
 In addition, most of the control variables do have the expected sign and many 
of them are statistically significant. The sales from operation abroad as a proxy for 
geographical diversification are positively related to Q though without significance, 
the logarithm of total assets as indication of size has a negative sign as in Lang and 
Stulz [Lang/Stulz, 1994] also without significance, while more profitable firms appear 
to have higher Q as expected. The capital expenditures as percentage of total sales 
show significance with respect to Q but have the opposite of the expected sign, as the 
market seems to value less firms with high capital expenditures and investment 
opportunities contrary to what the theory predicts, while the activation in many 
business segments leads to significantly lower firm value, in line with most previous 
research. Firms with more leverage have lower value, whereas firms that paid a 
dividend have significantly higher Q, fact that can be anticipated as a signal on behalf 
of firm management of constant future profitability14. Meanwhile, both the research 
and development expenses and the advertising expenses are positively related to Q, 
the former ones are significant at the level of 1%, as that significant but with a 
negative sign are the year dummies. 
 In the subsample of firms with foreign exchange exposure the coefficient of 
the foreign exchange derivatives dummy takes the value of 0.083, which even though 
it is not statistically significant, is within the expected range and verifies the positive 
relationship between hedging and firm value. The parameters of the control variables 
                                                
13 Carter et al (2004a) and Lookman (2003). 
14 The results do not support the interpretation of the dividend dummy as indication of the ability of 
firm to access the financial markets, which in that case should be negatively related to firm value Q.  
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remain almost the same and the coefficient of determination (R-squared) is 
maintained at high levels. Under the next column of firms with interest rate exposure 
the significant effect of the usage of interest rate derivatives on firm value is 
confirmed, as the coefficient of the corresponding hedge dummy reaches 0.061 or 
6.1% premium on firm value, significant at the level of 5%. As far as the control 
variables are concerned, the only change worth mentioning is the sign of the proxy for 
size that is now positively and significantly related to Q. 
 The previous analysis is repeated in Panel B of the same table, with only 
difference the proxy for firm value, which is now given by the logarithm of the 
alternative estimation of Tobins Q, Q1 (equal to the ratio of market to book value of 
equity)15. In the whole sample the hedge coefficient is positive, significant at 5% and 
equals 0.092, while from the viewpoint of the control variables the negative 
relationship between size and firm value and the positive relationship between 
profitability and firm value are strengthened (statistical significance of 10%). The 
coefficient of the foreign exchange derivatives dummy in firms with relative exposure 
is significantly different from zero at the level of 1% and amounts 0.363, value which 
is among the largest ever observed in studies of this kind that use the fixed effects 
methodology. An increase of that magnitude in firm value cannot be attributed 
exclusively to the use of derivatives, even in firms with excessive exposure to risks 
and on that account it is treated with reservations. In firms with exposure to interest 
rate risk the hedge dummy coefficient takes the value of -0.094, i.e. a discount in firm 
value due to hedging with derivatives, outcome that contradicts the results of most 
previous studies, however without any sign of significance. 
 Finally, in order to determine whether the change in the estimation of firm 
value also alters the nature of the impact of hedging on firm value, the same 
regression as before is run with dependent variable the ratio of market value of equity 
to total sales this time. (alternative Q2). The outcome of the estimation is displayed in 
Panel C of Table 7, the hedge coefficient in the full sample takes the value of 0.117, 
which is within the acceptable range but not significant, while the foreign currency 
derivatives usage dummy coefficient in firms with relative exposure remains highly 
significant at the level of 1% and almost as extreme as before, with a value of 0.339. 
                                                
15 The ratio of market to book value of equity as also the variable Tobins Q- reflects not only firm 
value but also the growth options of the firm, as these have been incorporated in stock price. The same 
holds for the ratio of market value of equity to total sales, variable that will be used immediately after. 
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In firms with interest rate exposure the use of interest rate derivatives has a positive 
but not significant impact on firm value- the size of the coefficient is 0.155-, the 
coefficients of the control variables hold almost the same, whereas the year dummies 
are significant, as in all previous cases. 
 
D. Sensitivity analysis. 
 
 In order to uphold the robustness of the initial results with respect to the 
impact of hedging on firm value -as given by the main proxy Tobins Q-, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted that comprises three different tests. These are: 
 
i) Elimination of outliers. 
According to the first of it control takes place for the potential impact of 
outliers by censoring the values of the dependent variable Tobins Q and by repeating 
the initial regression. The very distant from the mean values of Q are removed from 
the sample, and as a consequence the firm-years observations in the full sample are 
reduced to 238, in the sample of firms with foreign exposure to 176 and in the sample 
of firms with interest rate exposure to 219, thus the panel of the data ceases to be 
balanced in all three cases. The main target of this method is to reduce the noise in 
the data and to improve the fit of the regression so as to better explain the relationship 
between hedging and firm value and as Table 8 displays, this technique leads to the 
strengthening of the results. 
 Derivatives usage leads to significantly higher firm value for firms in the full 
sample -5% premium significant at the level of 1%- while premium of almost equal 
size (5.1%) and significance (level of 5%) is created in firms with exposure to interest 
rates through the use of derivatives suitable for hedging this type of risk. Firms with 
exposure to foreign exchange risk that use derivatives for hedging are rewarded even 
more by the market with a premium of 12% on firm value, highly significant at the 
level of 1%. These results are truly more qualitative and support the existence of a 
positive and significant relation between hedging and firm value. No striking changes 
are observed in the coefficients of the control variables, with the exception of the 
profitability dummy coefficient whose sign fluctuates and is not significant and of the 
capital expenditures that are strongly negatively related to firm value, contrary to 
expectations. The research and development expenses have a positive relation with 
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firm value, the year dummies are significant as always and the fit of the regression is 
preserved in really high levels (R-squared between 0.886 and 0.914).  
 
ii) Treatment of potential collinearity with the use of alternative control 
variable. 
The existence of high correlation between two variables of a model because 
the one can be expressed as a function of the other is a commonly addressed problem 
in econometric studies of this kind, which may introduce some noise and may lead to 
inconsistent results. In the case of the current regression the total assets of the firm are 
used in the estimation method of the dependent variable Tobins Q, as well as a proxy 
for size, in order to control for its effect on the value of the firm (control variable in 
the form of logarithm). In an attempt to eliminate the probability of any amount of 
influence on that account on the parameters of the investigated relationship between 
hedging and firm value, the initial analysis is repeated with the logarithm of total sales 
in the position of total assets to control for the effect of size and the results are 
displayed in Table 9. 
 In comparison with the results of the initial regression as presented in Panel A 
of Table 7, this test does not produce any major quantitative, but mainly a few 
qualitative changes. The hedge dummy coefficient in the full sample increases from 
0.04 to 0.05 and preserves its significance at the level of 1%, while the respective 
coefficient in firms with foreign exchange exposure remains almost the same  0.083 
in previous test, 0.0087 in this one- but becomes significant at the level of 10%. As 
far as the usage of interest rate derivatives in firms with relative exposure is 
concerned a differentiation takes place, as the dummy coefficient increases to 0.093 
from 0.061 at the beginning and becomes significant at 1%, contrary to a weaker 
significance of 5% in the initial regression. The coefficient of the size proxy (log of 
total sales) becomes strictly positive in all samples and highly significant (at the level 
of 1% and 5%) and its value lies within the range 0.126-0.167, however the other 
control variables display no substantial change. The coefficient of determination 2R  
keeps taking really high prices. 
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iii) Control for the potential existence of managerial motives. 
 The last dimension of the sensitivity analysis is related to the potential 
influence that managerial motives concurrently have on the hedging decision and on 
firm performance, which may be powerful enough to alter the observed relationship 
between derivatives usage and firm value. An extensive part of the corporate hedging 
theory is attributed to the agency costs that arise due to the conflict between managers 
and shareholders and to how derivatives can help minimize this cost of the company. 
A limited number of researchers, among those who have dealt with derivatives usage, 
argue that the impact of hedging on firm value is caused by the fact that it is a noisy 
proxy for other factors that have an effect on firm value and which have not been 
previously considered in the analysis and they support that managerial motives are 
one of such factors16. Controlling for these motives leads to a severe loss of up to 70% 
of the magnitude and of the statistical significance of the hedging premium on firm 
value. 
 Moreover, other researchers such as Hagelin et al. (2004) examine the 
possession on behalf of management of stock options and how this common practice 
affects their hedging strategy. They conclude that when derivatives usage is 
performed according to the dictates of theory (to reduce the underinvestment costs, 
taxes, costs of financial distress, etc.) it leads to higher firm value, whereas when it is 
performed in order to reduce the price sensitivity (delta) of the stock options held by 
the management team, then it leads to a significant discount in firm value. 
 As a proxy for managerial motives the CEO dummy is used, which takes the 
value of one if the CEO is the largest shareholder or belongs to the family who is the 
controlling shareholder of the firm and zero otherwise and is used as an additional 
control variable to the basic regression, in accordance with Hagelin et al. (2004)17. 
When the CEO is the largest shareholder, he has two different options: he can either 
fall into line with the rest of the shareholders and seek to maximize the firm value by 
choosing the optimal hedging strategy, or he can hedge his personal excessive 
exposure that stems from the ownership of the firm, policy that will lead to a non-
efficient and expensive corporate hedging strategy (total hedge even of secondary 
risks, at very high cost).   
                                                
16 Lookman (2003). 
17 Lack of detailed data concerning the stock option program of firms does not allow usage of more 
sophisticated variables such as the sensitivity parameters of the stock options (greeks), as proxies for 
managerial motives. 
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 The results are displayed in Table 10, however conclusions can be extracted 
only for the full sample and for the subsample of firms with exposure to interest rate 
risk. The econometric software cannot produce results for the sample of firms with 
foreign exchange exposure, due to perfect collinearity. The coefficient of the hedge 
dummy in the full sample remains positive and as significant as in the initial 
regression at the level of 1% (Table 7, Panel A) and not only is it not weakened, but 
its magnitude increases slightly from 0.04 to 0.046. In firms with interest rate 
exposure hedging appears to create ceteris paribus a premium of 5.6% on firm value, 
significant at the level of 10%, contrary to a premium of 6.1% on firm value, of 5% 
significance in the initial regression.   
 In both samples the differentiation in the impact of derivatives usage on firm 
value after controlling for managerial motives is much smaller compared to previous 
studies and the hypothesis that hedging is a noisy proxy for other variables, for 
which when control takes place the positive relationship between hedging and firm 
value disappears is not confirmed. Meanwhile, the CEO dummy coefficient is 
negative and not statistically significant as in Hagelin et al. (2004), but falls short of 
size (-0.04 on average versus -0.17 in the corresponding survey). 
 
E. Interpretation of the results.  
Having completed the empirical analysis, a brief review leads to the following 
critical conclusions: a) for firms in the whole sample the hedge dummy coefficient is 
on average 0.046, significant at the level of 1% in all tests where Tobins Q is used as 
a proxy for firm value, b) for firms with exposure to foreign exchange risk the 
coefficient of the foreign exchange derivatives usage dummy takes on average the 
value of 0.096, significant at the level of 1% and 10% and c) the interest rate 
derivatives usage dummy for firms with relative exposure takes on average the value 
of 0.065, also with significance of 1% to 10%. These results emerge from the analysis 
of the basic regression as well as from the sensitivity analysis that consists of three 
different controls as they have been previously described, always with Tobins Q as 
the dependent variable. 
 It thus becomes obvious that the impact of hedge on firm value is more 
powerful in the full sample where it leads to a significant value premium of 4.6%, 
contrary to a weaker impact in the two subsamples. This happens as hedging in the 
full sample proxies the use of any kind of derivative contrary to the sample of firms 
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with foreign exchange risk exposure for example, where the hedge dummy represents 
the use of foreign exchange derivatives only. However in this case firms which are 
exposed to foreign exchange risk and use commodity or interest rate derivatives only, 
due to parallel exposure, enjoy the benefits of hedging but are considered non-hedgers 
of the risk under examination, fact that makes harder the identification of a significant 
relation between usage of derivatives and firm value. 
Meanwhile, the use of the two alternative estimations of the dependent 
variable Q as proxies for firm value leads to weaker and somewhat different results  
the hedge dummy coefficient increases in magnitude and approaches the value of 0.10 
without being always statistically significant, with the exception of the foreign 
currency hedge dummy coefficient that takes the extreme value of 0.351 and is highly 
significant-, which are not totally comparable to the results when using Tobins Q. 
The only previous research that provides comparable data concerning the alternative 
estimations of Q is the one conducted by Allayannis and Weston [Allayannis/Weston, 
2001], who have found the use of foreign exchange derivatives to have caused a 
premium of 5.2% and 7.4% on firm value as proxied by Q1 and Q2 alternatively, 
significant at the level of 1% in both cases.  
 Back into the analysis with Tobins Q as the dependent variable, the size of 
the premium which emerges is in line with many of the relative studies conducted in 
the past. For example, Bartram et al. (2003) find the hedge dummy coefficient in an 
internationalized sample to take the value of 0.09 significant at 10% and in particular 
the interest rate derivatives usage to have a significant impact of 13% on firm value, 
significant at 1%. Carter et al. (2004a) in a sample of firms with high exposure to fuel 
prices find the coefficient of the relative derivatives dummy to be highly significant 
and to vary between 0.12 and 0.16, while Hagelin et al. (2004) estimate the premium 
on firm value from the use of foreign exchange derivatives to be 17.2%, which 
reduces to 7.9% after controlling for managerial motives and becomes insignificant. 
Allayannis et al. (2003) find a premium of 14.5% in firms with foreign exchange 
exposure which declines to 9% after censoring the data for outliers, whereas as a basis 
for comparison stand the conclusions of Allayannis and Weston [Allayannis/Weston, 
2001], who have found hedging to create a value premium of 4.8% on average, after a 
series of tests. 
 The differences in the size of the premium observed are attributed to the 
totally different samples under investigation, as well as to the alternative econometric 
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methods undertaken. Nevertheless, it is highly satisfactory that the impact on firm 
value that this paper reveals -4.6% on average in the full sample of firms- is within 
the accepted range and very close to the corresponding premium of Allayannis and 
Weston [Allayannis/Weston, 2001], whose methodology the current analysis follows, 
and is adequately significant on an econometric basis. On the other hand, as potential 
weaknesses of the current analysis could be perceived the limited time horizon of the 
research and the inability to control for other factors examined in previous studies that 
might influence both hedging and firm value, such as the effectiveness of the 
management, the agency costs between managers and stockholders and the degree of 
financial constraint of the firm. 
 From the viewpoint of the origin of the revealed hedging premium on firm 
value, it is based on the main motives the hedging theory suggests and on previous 
studies that have managed to quantify the effects of these motives. In particular, 
Carter et al. (2004a) argue that at least 52% of the impact of hedging on firm value 
they have revealed stems from its capacity to constrain the underinvestment problem 
and to protect the ability of firms to implement their investment program, even in 
adverse financial conditions. Graham and Rogers [Graham/Rogers, 2002] estimate the 
usage of derivatives to increase the mean leverage of firms by 3.03%, which creates 
tax benefits from the additional debt equal to 1.1%-2.1% of the market value of firms 
assets and contributes to an equivalent rise in firm value. Allayannis and Weston 
[Allayannis/Weston, 2001] consider the costs of financial distress for a firm 
approaching such a situation to be 0.02% of its value and due to hedging default can 
be avoided, increasing the firm value by the same amount. Last, with respect to the 
cash flow volatility, Allayannis et al. (2005) confirm that the market evaluates higher 
firms with smooth and easily predictable cashflows. Since a basic motive for hedging 
corporate risks is the reduction in cash flow volatility which has a severe cost for 
firms (an increase in cash flow volatility by one standard deviation leads to an 
aggregate reduction in firm value by 30%-37%), it is this the exact mechanism 
through with hedging contributes to the maximization of firm value, according to the 
authors. 
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VI. Conclusions. 
 
 This research aims to provide an answer to the question of whether using 
derivatives for hedging corporate risks is a value adding corporate activity. Built on 
the most widely accepted model for estimating the hedge effect on firm value, the 
empirical analysis is adjusted to the domestic financial environment, while 
embodying the latest evidence from related studies concerning factors that influence 
the hedging activity. 
The outcome of the analysis is supportive of a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between hedging with derivatives and firm value for firms 
with exposure to financial risks, which is confirmed after a series of controls.  It is 
interpreted as evidence that when hedging is rationally performed it leads to higher 
firm value. There is no evidence in favour of the hypothesis that managers engage in 
hedging for their own benefit as in this case firm value would decrease, or that 
hedging is a noisy proxy for omitted variables that are correlated with firm value.  
Considerable contribution of this research is that it verifies the positive value 
effect of derivatives in a sample of firms that are much smaller, less internationalized, 
less sophisticated and familiar with the global financial industry, contrary to the 
sample of most previous studies. However, it is revealed that even in a small, regional  
market as the native one, hedging with derivatives may strengthen the growth options 
of the firm and contribute value to it, as well as that there are certain factors and 
corporate properties that necessitate hedging, irrespective of the environment of 
activation. 
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Table 1.Α.       
Summary statistics         
This table presents the summary statistics of all variables for the years 2004-2006. Panel A includes 81 firms 
(whole sample) with a total of 243 firm-year observations, Panel B includes the 60 firms of the sample with 
exposure to Foreign Exchange risk and has 180 firm-year observations, while Panel C includes the 74 firms of 
the sample with exposure to the interest rate risk and thus 222 firm-year observations emerge. Definitions of the 
variables are presented in Table 2.  
  No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Panel A: Full Sample       
       
Total Assets (millions Euro) 243 923.975  1960.37 330.939 31.658 12938.08 
Total Sales (millions Euro) 243 726.872  1265.33 281.115 100.669 8121.49 
Foreign Exposure dummy 243  0.786  0.411 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Tot. Debt/ BVEquity 243 1.540 3.592  0.895  0.00 51.41 
Foreign Sales/ Tot. Sales 243  0.218  0.274  0.083  0.00  0.96 
MVEquity (millions Euro) 243 763.865  1710.56 189.528 14.905 11155.81 
Interest Rate Exposure 243  0.946  0.225 1.00  0.00 1.00 
       
HEDGE dummy 243  0.444  0.498  0.00  0.00 1.00 
FCD dummy 243  0.341  0.475  0.00  0.00 1.00 
IRD dummy 243  0.279  0.449  0.00  0.00 1.00 
       
Tobin's Q 243 1.447 1.070 1.122  0.435 10.19 
AltQ1: MVEquity/BVEquity 243  0.821 1.103  0.509  0.065 9.730 
AltQ2: MVEquity/ Total Sales 243  0.878  0.735  0.620  0.067 3.656 
       
Control Variables       
Return on Assets 243  0.057  0.082  0.036  0.00  0.628 
Cap. Expenditures/ Tot. Sales 243  0.092  0.143  0.050  0.001 1.027 
Leverage: Long Debt/ 
BVEquity 243 1.115 5.530  0.469  0.00 74.09 
R&D/ Tot.Assets 243  0.00  0.003  0.00  0.00  0.024 
Dividend dummy 243  0.761  0.427 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Industry diversif. Dummy 243  0.345  0.476  0.00  0.00 1.00 
Advertising/ Tot. Sales 243  0.007  0.0199  0.00  0.00  0.111 
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Table 1.Α. (continued) No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Panel B: Firms with Foreign 
Exchange  exposure       
       
Total Assets (millions Euro) 180 917.283 1703.39 331.028 91.458 12548.60 
Total Sales (millions Euro) 180 812.580  1361.34 309.192 100.669 8121.49 
Foreign Sales/ Tot.Sales 180  0.268  0.281  0.138  0.00  0.96 
MVEquity (millions Euro) 180 889.073 1892.46 220.773 14.905 11155.81 
       
HEDGE dummy 180  0.477  0.500  0.00  0.00 1.00 
FCD dummy 180  0.388  0.488  0.00  0.00 1.00 
IRD dummy 180  0.283  0.451  0.00  0.00 1.00 
       
Tobin's Q 180 1.529 1.191 1.164  0.435 10.19 
AltQ1: MVEquity/BVEquity 180  0.901 1.212  0.563  0.072 9.730 
AltQ2: MVEquity/ Total Sales 180  0.892  0.704  0.662  0.067 3.656 
       
       
Panel C: Firms with Interest 
Rate exposure       
       
Total Assets (millions Euro) 222 969.837  2043.06 331.737 31.658 12938.08 
Total Sales (millions Euro) 222 720.145  1265.28 279.004 100.669 8121.49 
Foreign Sales/ Tot.Sales 222  0.229  0.274  0.097  0.00  0.96 
MVEquity (millions Euro) 222 699.189  1539.40 180.735 14.905 11155.81 
       
HEDGE dummy 222  0.450  0.498  0.00  0.00 1.00 
FCD dummy 222  0.346  0.477  0.00  0.00 1.00 
IRD dummy 222  0.297  0.458  0.00  0.00 1.00 
       
Tobin's Q 222 1.322  0.604 1.106  0.646 4.121 
AltQ1: MVEquity/BVEquity 222  0.681  0.634  0.494  0.065 3.314 
AltQ2: MVEquity/ Total Sales 222  0.845  0.737  0.575  0.067 3.656 
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Table 1.Β.       
Summary statistics         
This table presents the summary statistics of all variables for the years 2004-2006. Panel A describes firms that 
use derivatives for hedging their risks with a total of 108 firm-year observations. Firms that do not use 
derivatives for hedging are included in Panel B, where 135 firm-year observations emerge.  Definitions of the 
variables are presented in Table 2. 
 
  No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Panel A: Hedgers (full 
sample)       
Total Assets (millions Euro) 108 
 
1564.16  2779.14 481.385 82.198 12938.09
Total Sales (millions Euro) 108 
 
1073.04  1645.53 372.263 104.442  8121.49 
Foreign Exposure dummy 108  0.833  0.374 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Foreign Sales/ Tot. Sales 108  0.307  0.276  0.241  0.00  0.884 
MVEquity (millions Euro) 108 
 
1180.39  2068.82 296.521 25.831 11155.81
Tot. Debt/ BVEquity 108 1.143 1.011  0.927 0.00 6.861 
Interest Rate Exposure 108  0.963  0.189 1.00  0.00 1.00 
FCD dummy 108  0.768  0.423 1.00  0.00 1.00 
IRD dummy 108  0.629  0.485 1.00  0.00 1.00 
       
Tobin's Q 108 1.406  0.672 1.164  0.435 3.387 
AltQ1: MVEquity/BVEquity 108  0.794  0.665  0.515  0.129 2.91 
AltQ2: MVEquity/ Total Sales 108 1.030  0.784  0.830  0.147 3.656 
       
Control Variables       
Return on Assets 108  0.058  0.053  0.044  0.00  0.24 
Cap. Expenditures/ Tot. Sales 108  0.116  0.178  0.060  0.001 1.027 
Leverage: Long Debt/ 
BVEquity 108  0.766  0.796  0.653 0.00 4.81 
R&D/ Tot.Assets 108  0.00  0.003  0.00  0.00  0.022 
Dividend dummy 108  0.88  0.327 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Industry diversif. Dummy 108  0.370  0.485  0.00  0.00 1.00 
Advertising/ Tot. Sales 108  0.003  0.008  0.00  0.00  0.048 
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Table 1.B. (continued) No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Panel B: Non-hedgers (full 
sample)       
       
Total Assets (millions Euro) 135 411.822 422.446 282.873 31.658 2544.25 
Total Sales (millions Euro) 135 449.934 745.283 223.184 100.669  4633.43 
Foreign Exposure dummy 135  0.748  0.435 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Foreign Sales/ Tot. Sales 135  0.147  0.250  0.019  0.00  0.96 
MVEquity (millions Euro) 135 430.642  1270.81 120.574 14.905  9340.32 
Tot. Debt/ BVEquity 135 1.858 4.718  0.868 0.00 51.41 
Interest Rate Exposure 135  0.933  0.250 1.00  0.00 1.00 
       
Tobin's Q 135 1.480 1.306 1.097  0.646 10.19 
AltQ1: MVEquity/BVEquity 135  0.841 1.357  0.501  0.065 9.73 
AltQ2: MVEquity/ Total Sales 135  0.755  0.672  0.507  0.067 3.097 
       
Control Variables       
Return on Assets 135  0.056  0.099  0.029  0.00  0.628 
Cap. Expenditures/ Tot. Sales 135  0.073  0.103  0.041  0.001  0.628 
Leverage: Long Debt/ 
BVEquity 135 1.152 6.369  0.358  0.00  74.09 
R&D/ Tot.Assets 135  0.00  0.003  0.00  0.00  0.024 
Dividend dummy 135  0.666  0.473 1.00  0.00 1.00 
Industry diversif. Dummy 135  0.326  0.470  0.00  0.00 1.00 
Advertising/ Tot. Sales 135  0.011  0.025  0.00  0.00  0.111 
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Table 2  
List of Variables  
This table presents the definitions of the variables used in this article. 
 
Total Assets (TAss) Book value of total assets in millions Euro 
Total Sales (Tsal) Book value of total sales in millions Euro 
Foreign exposure dummy 
(FX exposure ) 
Equals one if the firm reports any foreign assets, income or sales  
and zero otherwise 
Foreign Sales/ Tot.Sales 
(FSTS) 
Sales from operation abroad divided by the book value of total sales 
(as an indication of the geographical diversification of the firm) 
Market Value of Equity 
(MVE) 
Number of oustanding common equities multiplied by the market 
price of equity on 31/12 each year, in millions Euro 
Interest Rate Exposure 
dummy (IR expo) 
Equals one if the firm reports any debt in fluctuating interest rate and 
zero otherwise 
Total Debt/ BVEquity  
(TD/BVE) 
Amount of total debt divided by the book value of common equity 
 
                                    
Hedge dummy  (HDG) 
 
Equals one if the firm reports hedging its risks through the use of 
any kind of derivative with underlying value foreign currencies, 
interest rates or commodities and zero otherwise 
Foreign Currency 
Derivatives dummy (FCD 
dummy) 
Equals one if the firm reports hedging its risks through the use of 
any kind of derivative with underlying value foreign currencies and 
zero otherwise 
Interest Rates Derivatives 
dummy (IRD dummy) 
 
Equals one if the firm reports hedging its risks through the use of 
any kind of derivative with underlying value interest rates and zero 
otherwise 
Tobin's Q Book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of common equity all divided by book value of total assets 
AltQ1: MVE/BVE 
 
Market value of common equity divided by the book value of  
common equity 
AltQ2: MVE/ Total Sales  
 
Market value of common equity divided by the book value of  
total sales 
Return On Assets 
(ROA) 
Annual net income after taxes divided by the book value of total 
assets 
Capital Expenditures/ Tot. 
Sales (CXTS) 
Ratio of expenditures on new capital to total sales  
 
Leverage: Long Debt/ 
BVEquity (LDBE) 
Amount of long term debt divided by the book value of common 
equity 
R&D/ Tot.Assets (RDTAS) 
 
Research and Development expenditures scaled by the book value of 
total assets  
Dividend dummy (DIV) 
 
Equals one if the firm paid dividend that year and zero otherwise 
 
Industry Diversification 
dummy (IND) 
 
Equals one if the firm is active in more than one business segment 
and zero otherwise 
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Advertising/ Tot. Sales 
(ADSA) 
Ratio of advertising expenditures to total sales 
 
CEO dummy (CEO) 
 
 
Equals one if the manager is the controling (largest) shareholder or 
comes from the family who is the largest shareholder and zero 
otherwise 
Y1 (year) dummy 
 
Equals one if the firm data concern fiscal year 2004 and zero 
otherwise 
Y2 (year) dummy 
  
Equals one if the firm data concern fiscal year 2005 and zero 
otherwise 
Y3 (year) dummy 
  
Equals one if the firm data concern fiscal year 2006 and zero 
otherwise 
Industry dummy I1 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Oil and Gas Industry (ICB 
0500) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I2 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Chemicals Industry 
(ICB 1300) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I3 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Raw Materials Industry 
(ICB 1700) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I4 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Construction and 
Construction Materials Industry (ICB 2300) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I5 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Manufacturing Products and 
Services Industry  (ICB 2700) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I6 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Food and Beverages 
Industry (ICB 3500) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I7 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Personal and House 
Products Industry  (ICB 3700) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I8 
  
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Health Services Sector (ICB 
4500) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I9 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Trade Sector (ICB 5300) and 
zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I10 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Media and Publishing Sector 
(ICB 5500) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I11 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Travel and Leisure Industry 
(ICB 5700) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I12 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Telecommunication Industry 
(ICB 6500) and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I13 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Utilities Sector (ICB 7500) 
and zero otherwise 
Industry dummy I14 
 
Equals one if the firm is activated in the Technology Industry (ICB 
9500) and zero otherwise 
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Table 3  
Firms' Hedging over time   
This Table presents the alteration in the number of firms that use derivatives across the 
years 2004-2006. Firms are distinguished on whether they have exposure to foreign 
exchange risk and to interest rate risk. The definitions of the variables are presented in 
Table 2.  
   
Years 2004 2005 2006 Total   
       
Full Sample       
Number of firms 81 81 81 243   
Hedgers 34 36 38 108   
% 41.98% 44.44% 46.91% 44.44%   
       
Firms with FX exposure       
No of firms 60 60 60 180   
FX hedgers 23 23 24 70   
% 38.33% 38.33% 40.00% 38.89%   
       
Firms with IR exposure       
No of firms 74 74 74 222   
IR hedgers 21 22 23 66   
% 28.38% 29.73% 31.08% 29.73%   
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Table 4  
Comparison of hedgers and non-hedgers  
This table presents the comparison in the mean and median values of certain variables between hedgers 
and non-hedgers, not only in the full sample (Panel A) but also in the sample of firms with exposure to 
foreign exchange risk (Panel B) and with exposure to interest rate risk (Panel C). Results were produced by 
using the econometric software Eviews, Edition 5, which follows the t-statistic methodology for the 
comparison of means and the Wilcoxon/ Mann-Whitney one for the comparison of medians and gives the 
corresponding p-values in each case. The definitions of the variables are presented in Table 2.  
 
Panel A: hedgers versus non-hedgers, Full Sample 
Variable 
(1) 
Hedgers 
(108 obs) 
(2) 
Non-
hedgers 
(135 obs) 
(3)= (1)- 
(2) 
Difference 
tstat 
/(mean), 
Wilcoxon/ 
(median) 
 
(p- value) 
Tobin's Q (mean) 1.406 1.480 - 0.074 0.538 0.590 
Tobin's Q (median) 1.164 1.097   0.067 1.167 0.243 
Alt Q1: MVE/BVE (mean) 0.794 0.841 - 0.047 0.326 0.744 
Alt Q1: MVE/BVE (med.) 0.515 0.501   0.014 2.094 0.03 
Alt Q2:MVE/TSAL (mean) 1.030 0.755   0.275 2.94 0.003 
Alt Q2:MVE/TSAL (med.) 0.830 0.507   0.323 3.424 0.000 
Tot.Assets /millions Euro  
(mean) 1564.16 411.822 1152.34 4.751 0.000 
Tot.Assets /millions Euro 
(median) 481.385 282.873 198.512 5.497 0.000 
      
Panel B: For. Currency Derivatives users versus non-users among firms with FX exposure 
Variable 
(1) 
Hedgers 
(70 obs) 
(2) 
Non-
hedgers 
(110 obs) 
(3)= (1)- 
(2) 
Difference 
tstat / 
( mean), 
Wilcoxon/ 
(median) 
 
(p.value) 
Tobin's Q (mean) 1.481 1.560 - 0.079 0.434 0.664 
Tobin's Q (median) 1.178 1.139   0.039 1.119 0.263 
Alt Q1: MVE/BVE (mean) 0.885 0.912 - 0.027 0.141 0.887 
Alt Q1: MVE/BVE (med.) 0.599 0.553   0.046 1.861 0.062 
Alt Q2:MVE/TSAL (mean) 1.012 0.815   0.197 1.834 0.068 
Alt Q2:MVE/TSAL (med.) 0.796 0.575   0.221 2.271 0.023 
Tot.Assets /millions Euro  
(mean) 1047.23 834.587 212.646 0.815 0.415 
Tot.Assets /millions Euro 
(median) 535.851 287.345 248.506 3.816 0.000 
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Panel C: Interest Rate Derivatives users versus non-users among firms with IR exposure 
Variable 
(1) 
Hedgers 
(66 obs) 
(2) 
Non-
hedgers 
(156 obs) 
(3)= (1)- 
(2) 
Difference 
tstat 
/(mean), 
Wilcoxon/ 
(median) 
 
(p.value)
Tobin's Q (mean) 1.386 1.295 0.091 1.019 0.308 
Tobin's Q (median) 1.117 1.099 0.018 0.587 0.556 
Alt Q1: MVE/BVE (mean) 0.746 0.654 0.092 0.986 0.324 
Alt Q1: MVE/BVE (med.) 0.473 0.506 - 0.033    0.828 0.407 
Alt Q2:MVE/TSAL (mean) 1.091 0.742 0.349 3.296 0.001 
Alt Q2:MVE/TSAL (med.) 0.853 0.504 0.349 3.104 0.001 
Tot.Assets /millions Euro  
(mean) 2086.98 497.200 1589.78 5.658 0.000 
Tot.Assets /millions Euro 
(median) 680.031 294.700 385.331 5.709 0.000 
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Table 5     
Breusch-Pagan test 
       
Dependent Variable: LOG(?Q)   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Sample: 2004 2006   
Included observations: 3   
Cross-sections included: 81   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 243  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.090880 0.290479 -0.312862 0.7547 
?HDG 0.030279 0.050552 0.598972 0.5498 
?FSTS -0.059516 0.087868 -0.677341 0.4989 
LOG(?TAS) 0.006817 0.023284 0.292778 0.7700 
?ROA 3.266956 0.285909 11.42658 0.0000 
?CXTS -0.008454 0.158808 -0.053232 0.9576 
?IND -0.022002 0.047413 -0.464050 0.6430 
?LDBE 0.002106 0.004652 0.452825 0.6511 
?DIV 0.039540 0.056428 0.700725 0.4842 
?ADSA 2.890799 1.126063 2.567172 0.0109 
?RDTAS 15.63335 6.965299 2.244462 0.0257 
R-squared 0.433893 F-statistic 17.78162 
Adjusted R-squared 0.409491 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Sum squared resid 26.48374 Durbin-Watson stat 0.816003 
 
The test is performed by running the above regression with the logarithm of Tobins Q as the 
dependent variable and the LM value is calculated by following the type 
2
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Ν the number of cross sections (firms) and Τ the number of years. 
Under the null hypothesis the LM statistic is asymptotically distributed as 21χ . The 5% 
critical value from 21χ  is 3.841. Since the estimated LM value in the test is 54.33 and is 
larger than the critical value, the null hypothesis that 02 =ασ is rejected at the 5% level. As a 
consequence the random effects model is preferred versus the ordinary least square method. 
 
 
This test was performed by the use of the econometric software Eviews, Edition 5. 
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Table 6     
Hausman test       
 
 
Hausman test  
(fixed versus random effects)  
Chi-Square (10d.f.)  67.581 
 
 
The Hausman test statistic is given by the type  
( ) 1  m χ− ′=   2kq V q q ! ,  
where   β β= −FE REq  ,   ( ) ( ) ( )    β β= −FE REV q V V      and k the degrees of freedom (their 
number is equal to the number of the independent variables of the regression).  
Under the null hypothesis the test statistic m is asymptotically distributed as 210χ  . The 
resulting Hausman test statistic is  m = 67.58 and is much higher than the 5% critical value 
from 210χ  which is equal to 27.68. On that account the null hypothesis of random and not fixed 
effects in the residuals is rejected and the appropriate model to use is the fixed effects model. 
 
  
 
 
This test was performed by the use of the econometric software Eviews, Edition 5. 
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Table 7      
Effect of Derivatives use on firm value: regression results 
This table presents the results for fixed-effects regressions on the use of derivatives on firm value. In panel A the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of Tobin's Q, while in Panel B and C the dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the alternative Q1 (defined as the ratio of Market to Book value of Equity) and of the alternative Q2 (defined 
as the ratio of Market Value of Equity to Total sales) respectively. Under the column of all firms are the results 
of the regression in the whole sample (81 firms), under the one of firms with FX exposure are the results of the 
regression in firms with foreign assets, sales or income (60 firms) and under the column of firms with IR 
exposure are the results of the regression in firms with fluctuating debt (74 firms). C stands for the constant, 
HDG stands for the derivatives usage dummy, FCD stands for Foreign Currency Derivatives Usage Dummy, 
IRD stands for Interest Rate Derivatives Usage dummy, FSTS stands for the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, 
LOG(TAS) stands for the natural logarithm of total assets, ROA stands for return on assets, CXTS stands for 
capital expenditures to total sales, IND stands for industry diversification dummy, LDBE stands for the ratio of 
long term debt to Book value of Equity, DIV stands for the dividend  dummy, ADSA stands for the ratio of 
advertising expenses to total sales, RDTAS stands for research and development expenses to total assets, Y1 and 
Y2 stands for year dummies of 2004 and 2005 respectively.***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. T-statistics are based on White standard errors. The definitions of the variables are presented in 
Table 2. The estimations were conducted by using the Eviews econometric software. 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: ln (Tobin's Q) 
Dependent Variable: ln (Tobin's Q) All firms 
Firms with  
FX exposure 
Firms with  
IR exposure 
C                     
             
0.433 
(1.161) 
   1.131** 
(2.046) 
   -0.940*** 
(-4.524) 
HDG 
   
     0.040***
(29.845)   
FCD 
    
0.083 
(1.368)  
IRD 
     
   0.061** 
(2.156) 
FSTS 
   
0.065 
(1.192) 
0.057 
(1.419) 
0.113 
(1.303) 
LOG(TAS) 
   
-0.015 
(-0.504) 
-0.069 
(-1.609) 
     0.086*** 
(5.098) 
ROA 
   
0.124 
(0.375) 
 -0.015 
(-0.042) 
-0.003 
(-0.015) 
CXTS 
   
    -0.163**
(-2.296) 
 -0.278* 
(-1.671) 
     -0.407*** 
(-3.683) 
IND 
   
    -0.087***
(-7.028) 
    -0.030** 
(-2.019) 
     -0.081*** 
(-3.195) 
LDBE 
   
-0.002 
(-0.748) 
-0.003 
(-0.910) 
 -0.003 
(-0.944) 
DIV 
   
    0.048** 
(2.130) 
      0.112*** 
(3.341) 
    0.059** 
(2.113) 
ADSA 
   
     5.709***
(4.261) 
      4.757*** 
(4.767) 
     6.628*** 
(4.099) 
RDTAS 
   
4.098 
(0.872) 
-0.204 
(-0.036) 
7.004 
(1.285) 
Y1 
   
    -0.131***
(-60.568) 
     -0.174*** 
(-21.583) 
     -0.087*** 
(-43.365) 
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Y2 
   
    -0.067***
(-22.341) 
     -0.084*** 
(-10.739) 
     -0.054*** 
(-17.509) 
No. Observations 243 180 222 
 
 
   0.895 0.921              0.875 
      
Panel B. Dependent Variable: ln (altern.Q1= MVE/BVE)   
Dependent Variable: 
ln (altern.Q1= MVE/BVE) All firms 
Firms with  
FX exposure 
Firms with  
IR exposure 
C 
   
2.026 
(1.574) 
      2.471*** 
(2.699) 
0.647 
(0.570) 
HDG 
   
    0.092** 
(2.197)   
FCD 
    
      0.363*** 
(18.322)  
IRD 
     
-0.094 
(-1.312) 
FSTS 
   
-0.225 
(-1.123) 
0.019 
(0.117) 
-0.139 
(-0.680) 
LOG(TAS) 
   
 -0.203* 
(-1.893) 
     -0.261*** 
(-3.218) 
-0.097 
(-1.028) 
ROA 
   
  1.761* 
(1.839) 
 1.527* 
(1.716) 
     1.592** 
(1.998) 
CXTS 
   
-0.172 
(-1.125) 
 -0.531 
(-1.298) 
      -0.484*** 
(-7.547) 
IND 
   
    -0.195***
(-3.279) 
      0.193*** 
(4.453) 
      -0.159*** 
(-2.644) 
LDBE 
   
-0.009 
(-0.867) 
-0.010 
(-0.992) 
-0.010 
(-0.938) 
DIV 
   
 0.132* 
(1.923) 
     0.307*** 
(3.909) 
     0.151** 
(2.267) 
ADSA 
   
     9.893***
(3.398) 
   10.805** 
(2.590) 
      10.729*** 
(3.895) 
RDTAS 
   
 -3.213 
(-0.155) 
-6.054 
(-0.270) 
-0.665 
(-0.030) 
Y1 
   
    -0.413***
(-49.367) 
      -0.428*** 
(-30.528) 
      -0.376*** 
(-31.026) 
Y2 
   
    -0.206***
(-17.871) 
      -0.174*** 
(-7.851) 
       -0.202*** 
(-17.371) 
      
No. Observations 243 180 222 
 
    0.910 0.905 0.896 
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Panel C. Dependent Variable: ln (altern.Q2= MVE/TSALES)   
Dependent Variable: 
ln (altern.Q2= MVE/TSALES) All firms 
Firms with  
FX exposure 
Firms with  
IR exposure 
      
C 
   
0.597 
(0.334) 
0.742 
(0.492) 
-0.060 
(-0.036) 
HDG 
   
0.117 
(1.078)   
FCD 
    
      0.339*** 
(8.107)  
IRD 
     
0.155 
(0.855) 
FSTS 
   
-0.053 
(-0.277) 
0.109 
(0.785) 
-0.029 
(-0.146) 
LOG(TAS) 
   
-0.095 
(-0.639) 
-0.129 
(-1.027) 
-0.045 
(-0.331) 
ROA 
   
  1.522* 
(1.796) 
1.320 
(1.588) 
    1.399* 
(1.960) 
CXTS 
   
0.107 
(0.533) 
-0.095 
(-0.182) 
  -0.114 
(-0.922) 
IND 
   
-0.076 
(-0.830) 
      0.218*** 
(4.016) 
  -0.084 
(-1.158) 
LDBE 
   
-0.009 
(-0.808) 
-0.010 
(-0.948) 
  -0.009 
(-0.854) 
DIV 
   
     0.167***
(3.075) 
      0.349*** 
(6.093) 
        0.184*** 
(3.504) 
ADSA 
   
   10.774***
(3.889) 
      11.433*** 
(2.727) 
       11.313*** 
(4.216) 
RDTAS 
   
7.246 
(0.416) 
4.231 
(0.233) 
 7.711 
0.432 
Y1 
   
 -0.339*** 
(-46.066) 
      -0.349*** 
(-30.327) 
      -0.326*** 
(-50.914) 
Y2 
   
 -0.137*** 
(-14.179) 
      -0.101*** 
(-5.907) 
      -0.143*** 
(-18.995) 
      
No. Observations 243 180 222 
 
    0.906 0.886 0.909 
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Table 8      
Effect of Derivatives use on firm value: censored regression results after removing the outliers 
This table presents the results for fixed-effects regression on the use of derivatives on firm value, after the removal 
of outliers (with respect to Q). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q. Under the column of 
all firms are the results of the regression in the whole sample (238 observations), under the one of firms with FX 
exposure are the results of the regression in firms with foreign assets, sales or income (176 observations) and under 
the column of firms with IR exposure are the results of the regression in firms with fluctuating debt (219 
observations). C stands for the constant, HDG stands for the derivatives usage dummy, FCD stands for Foreign 
Currency Derivatives Usage Dummy, IRD stands for Interest Rate Derivatives Usage dummy, FSTS stands for the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales, LOG(TAS) stands for the natural logarithm of total assets, ROA stands for 
return on assets, CXTS stands for capital expenditures to total sales, IND stands for industry diversification 
dummy, LDBE stands for the ratio of long term debt to Book value of Equity, DIV stands for the dividend dummy, 
ADSA stands for the ratio of advertising expenses to total sales, RDTAS stands for research and development 
expenses to total assets, Y1 and Y2 stands for year dummies of 2004 and 2005 respectively.***,**,* denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics are based on White standard errors. The definitions 
of the variables are presented in Table 2. The estimations were conducted by using the Eviews econometric 
software. 
  
Dependent Variable:  
ln (Tobin's Q) All firms 
Firms with  
FX exposure 
Firms with  
IR exposure 
C 
   
-0.546 
(-1.618) 
0.055 
(0.082) 
   -0.636** 
(-2.454) 
HDG 
   
        0.050***
(7.778)   
FCD 
    
     0.120*** 
(2.801)  
IRD 
     
    0.051** 
(1.995) 
FSTS 
   
0.116 
(1.416) 
    0.142** 
(2.223) 
0.093 
(1.148) 
LOG(TAS) 
   
     0.059** 
(2.086) 
0.007 
0.146 
       0.066*** 
(2.953) 
ROA 
   
 0.023 
0.069 
-0.031 
(-0.092) 
 -0.040 
(-0.142) 
CXTS 
   
      -0.505***
(-19.527) 
      -0.602*** 
(-9.595) 
       -0.427*** 
 (-41.787) 
IND 
   
    -0.062** 
(-2.331) 
 0.045 
1.231 
        -0.088*** 
(-4.132) 
LDBE 
   
-0.003 
(-0.906) 
-0.003 
(-1.064) 
  -0.003 
(-0.983) 
DIV 
   
  0.049* 
(1.719) 
      0.110*** 
(2.719) 
       0.059** 
(2.191) 
ADSA 
   
       3.929***
(6.979) 
      4.938*** 
(5.469) 
        5.119*** 
(8.368) 
RDTAS 
   
5.296 
0.799 
2.452 
(0.354) 
4.922 
0.795 
Y1 
   
     -0.102***
(-16.942) 
     -0.133*** 
(-11.734) 
      -0.112*** 
(-22.168) 
 41
Y2 
   
    -0.077*** 
(-5.742) 
      -0.079*** 
(-8.105) 
      -0.078*** 
(-15.057) 
      
No. Observations 238 176 219 
 
    0.886 0.914 0.908 
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Table 9      
Effect of Derivatives use on firm value: regression results with sales as proxy for size 
This table presents the results for fixed-effects regressions on the use of derivatives on firm value with total sales 
as a proxy for size. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q. Under the column of all firms 
are the results of the regression in the whole sample (81 firms), under the one of firms with FX exposure are the 
results of the regression in firms with foreign assets, sales or income (60 firms) and under the column of firms 
with IR exposure are the results of the regression in firms with fluctuating debt (74 firms). C stands for the 
constant, HDG stands for the derivatives usage dummy, FCD stands for Foreign Currency Derivatives Usage 
Dummy, IRD stands for Interest Rate Derivatives Usage dummy, FSTS stands for the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales, LOG(TSAL) stands for the natural logarithm of total sales, ROA stands for return on assets, CXTS 
stands for capital expenditures to total sales, IND stands for industry diversification dummy, LDBE stands for the 
ratio of long term debt to Book value of Equity, DIV stands for the dividend  dummy, ADSA stands for the ratio 
of advertising expenses to total sales, RDTAS stands for research and development expenses to total assets, Y1 
and Y2 stands for  year dummies of 2004 and 2005 respectively.***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. T-statistics are based on White standard errors. The definitions of the variables are presented in 
Table 2. The estimations were conducted by using the Eviews econometric software. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
ln (Tobin's Q) All firms 
Firms with  
FX exposure 
Firms with  
IR exposure 
C 
   
    -1.522*** 
(-2.614) 
    -1.928*** 
(-3.189) 
 -1.452* 
(-1.828) 
HDG 
   
    0.050*** 
(4.734)   
FCD 
    
 0.087* 
(1.761)  
IRD 
     
       0.093*** 
(3.109) 
FSTS 
   
0.077* 
(1.888) 
0.036 
(0.787) 
 0.129 
(1.509) 
LOG(TSAL) 
   
     0.135*** 
(2.897) 
      0.167*** 
(3.455) 
     0.126** 
 (2.012) 
ROA 
   
0.144 
0.467 
0.050 
(0.150) 
 -0.012 
-0.065 
CXTS 
   
    -0.221** 
(-2.188) 
-0.326 
(-1.372) 
       -0.379*** 
   (-3.543) 
IND 
   
     -0.099***
(-26.325) 
   -0.097* 
(-1.872) 
      -0.078*** 
(-2.953) 
LDBE 
   
-0.003 
(-0.813) 
-0.003 
(-0.948) 
-0.003 
(-0.903) 
DIV 
   
    0.050** 
(2.031) 
      0.101*** 
(3.253) 
    0.059** 
(2.057) 
ADSA 
   
      6.189***
(4.721) 
       5.572*** 
(4.922) 
       6.741*** 
(3.896) 
RDTAS 
   
6.521 
(1.310) 
3.864 
(0.697) 
7.311 
(1.413) 
 43
Y1 
   
     -0.101***
(-14.912) 
      -0.128*** 
(-17.665) 
     -0.076*** 
(-9.250) 
Y2 
   
     -0.048***
(-23.109) 
      -0.059*** 
(-14.809) 
      -0.043*** 
(-8.137) 
    
No. Observations 243 180 222 
 
 
   0.896 0.922 0.876 
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Table 10      
Effect of Derivatives use on firm value after controling for managerial motives 
This table presents the results for fixed-effects regressions on the use of derivatives on firm value, after 
controling for managerial motives. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q. Under the 
column of all firms are the results of the regression in the whole sample (81 firms), under the one of firms with 
FX exposure are the results of the regression in firms with foreign assets, sales or income (60 firms) and under 
the column of firms with IR exposure are the results of the regression in firms with fluctuating debt (74 firms). 
C stands for the constant, HDG stands for the derivatives usage dummy, FCD stands for Foreign Currency 
Derivatives Usage Dummy, IRD stands for Interest Rate Derivatives Usage dummy, FSTS stands for the ratio 
of foreign sales to total sales, LOG(TAS) stands for the natural logarithm of total assets, ROA stands for return 
on assets, CXTS stands for capital expenditures to total sales, IND stands for industry diversification dummy, 
LDBE stands for the ratio of long term debt to Book value of Equity, DIV stands for the dividend  dummy, 
ADSA stands for the ratio of advertising expenses to total sales, RDTAS stands for research and development 
expenses to total assets, CEO stands for management control dummy and Y1 and Y2 stands for year dummies 
of 2004 and 2005 respectively.***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics 
are based on White standard errors. The definitions of the variables are presented in Table 2. The estimations 
were conducted by using the Eviews econometric software. 
 
Dependent Variable: ln (Tobin's Q) All firms 
Firms with  
FX exposure 
Firms with  
IR exposure 
C 
   
0.450 
(1.347)  
      -0.975*** 
(-6.096) 
HDG 
   
      0.046***
(2.956)   
FCD      
IRD 
     
 0.056* 
(1.843) 
FSTS 
   
0.061 
(1.004)  
0.119 
(1.270) 
LOG(TAS) 
   
-0.015 
(-0.496)  
      0.087*** 
(5.107) 
ROA 
   
0.125 
(0.379)  
 -0.005 
(-0.025) 
CXTS 
   
   -0.158** 
(-2.020)  
      -0.417*** 
(-3.331) 
IND 
   
     -0.093***
(-3.909)  
  -0.072* 
(-1.904) 
LDBE 
   
-0.002 
(-0.748)  
 -0.003 
(-0.941) 
DIV 
   
     0.048** 
(2.155)  
      0.059** 
(2.110) 
ADSA 
   
       5.731***
(4.108)  
         6.601*** 
(3.957) 
RDTAS 
   
4.112 
(0.873)  
 7.007 
(1.280) 
CEO 
   
-0.032 
(-0.425)  
-0.046 
(-0.613) 
 45
Y1 
   
     -0.131***
(-41.975)  
     -0.087*** 
(-49.153) 
Y2 
   
     -0.067***
(-19.832)  
      -0.054*** 
(-16.690) 
No. Observations 243 180 222 
 
 
   0.895 
 
Near singular 
matrix 0.875 
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